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REFUSAL TO DISCIPLINE DECEITFUL ILLINOIS
PROSECUTOR-IN RE FRIEDMAN
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility' (Code)
is often applied by the Illinois Supreme Court as a standard of professional
conduct. 2 Among the Code's provisions are prohibitions against deceit in
the courtroom and the creation and use of false evidence. 3  Nevertheless, in
In re Friedman, the supreme court discharged a disciplinary action against a
prosecutor, Morton Friedman, who admitted allowing and encouraging false
testimony in court. 4
The purpose of this Casenote is threefold. First, the Note will review the
court's fragmented reasoning, in which the court only indirectly addressed
the ethical question of the case. It will then demonstrate that Friedman's
conduct was unethical and that the supreme court should not have refused
to censure him because of the justification of "'good motive." Finally, the
Note will examine the impact of the decision on future attorney disciplinary
actions.
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. For a historical perspective on the
Code, see generally Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objec-
tives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1970). For a critical view of the present Code, see generally
Symposium, Reflection on a Decade Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C.L.
REV. 497 (1979); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702 (1977). Concerning the ABA's plans for a new Code, see Attorneys Pondering the
Ethics of Their Trade, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1979, § E, at 7; Tate, Ethical Standards Are an
Essential Foundation, 65 A.B.A.J. 1001 (1979).
2. Disciplinary rules are standards of conduct from which attorneys may not deviate with-
out being sanctioned. These disciplinary rules have often been cited in Illinois cases as grounds
fi)r attorney disciplinary action. See, e.g., In re Spencer, 68 111. 2d 496, 370 N.E.2d 210 (1977)
(DR 5-105(C)'s rule regarding conflict of interest applied as grounds for censure); In re Taylor,
66 I11. 2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (DR6-101(A)(3)'s a rule on neglecting a client's affairs
applied as grounds for one year suspension).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rules against deceit in-
clude the following sections:
DR 102(A)(4)-A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.
DR 7-102(A)(4)-In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly
use perjured testimony or false evidence.
DR 7-102(A)(6)-In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not participate in
the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the
evidence is false.
DR 7-109(B)-A lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to
leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable as a
witness therein.
4. 76 11. 2d 393, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979). See note 3 supra for the text of the four Disci-
plinary Rules Friedman was charged with breaking. Friedman was also charged with conduct
tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute.
The facts of the case were not disputed; Friedman admitted the conduct, but argued it was a
necessary prosecutorial tactic that in no way violated ethical standards. Id.
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The question of whether it can ever be ethical for an attorney to lie or
allow false statements in court has long been an unresolved and perplexing
problem. In recent years, Monroe Freedman, Professor of Law at Hofstra
University Law School, has been the leading advocate of the proposition that
the need for truthfulness can be outweighed by other factors, such as pro-
tecting client confidentiality. 5 Most commentators, however, have
disagreed strongly with Freedman's views. 6
Although few courts have directly addressed this issue, the California Su-
preme Court forbids deception by a member of the bar under any cir-
cumstances, even outside of the courtroom. 7  In support of this position,
California courts have considered irrelevant the amount of harm actually
caused by the attorney's deceit. 8 This approach was recently adopted by
5. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hard-
est Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN AD-
VERSARY SYSTEM 27-41 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN].
Other professions have similar dilemmas about the need for honesty. In journalism, for exam-
ple, the Pulitzer Prize Board refused to give the 1979 prize for local investigative reporting to
the Chicago Sun-Times because the newspaper ran a tavern under a false name to uncover local
corruption. One editor on the Pulitzer Board said reporters should never misrepresent them-
selves tinder any circumstances. See Debate on Exposis Held Up a Pulitzer, N.Y. Times, April
18, 1979, § B, at 4. See generally notes 75-77 and accompanying text infra.
6. Especially detailed criticism is provided in Rotunda, Book Review: Lawyer's Ethics in an
Adversary System, 89 HARv. L. REV. 622, (1976), and Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the
Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 653 (1977).
Lawrv asserts that the judicial system is corrupted whenever a lawyer lies in court. Id. at
654-95. Although he strongly disagrees with Freedman's ideas, Lawry compliments Freedman's
book as having an "indispensible place in the literature of professional responsibility, and it is,
at present, the port for all departures." ld. at 653. Lawry argues that even if total truthfulness
cannot always be expected, it should always be a goal: "The fact that the system may result in a
failure to gain the whole truth does not mean that the system can or does countenance lying."
Id. at 657.
For an argument that lawyers should never falter in honesty, even outside the courtroom, see
Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 583-90 (1975). Ru-
bin, a federal judge, also noted the scarcity of cases involving attorney dishonesty. Id. at 587.
See generally Frankel, The Search for Truth -An Unpireal View, 30 The Record of the Assoc.
of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 21 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976)
(attorney suspended from the practice of law for two years with three years probation for engag-
ing in covert, deceitful activities oi behalf of the re-election of the president of the United
States); Cutler v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 241, 455 P.2d 108, 78 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969) (attorney dis-
barred after attempting to deceive another attorney concerning the return of a client's fuids);
McKinney v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 194, 397 P.2d 425, 41 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1964) (attorney
disbarred after fraudulently endorsing documents to deceive bank).
8. See, e.g., Mosesian v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 3d 60, 500 P.2d 1115, 103 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1972)
(attorney reprimanded for falsely impugning under oath the sexual morality of his aunt); Reznik
v. State Bar, I Cal. 3d 198, 460 P.2d 969, 81 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1969) (attorney suspended from the
practice of law for three years after altering cancelled cheek in an unsuccessful effort to deceive
a court); MeKinney v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 194, 397 P.2d 425, 41 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1964).
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the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in disciplining an attorney be-
cause he used deceitful tactics in a labor dispute. 9 Furthermore, in 1978,
the New York Court of Appeals stated that a prosecutor could not ethically
encourage a witness to lie under oath solely for the purpose of obtaining a
perjury conviction against the witness.' 0 The New York court held that
bad prosecutorial motive can be a successful defense to the perjury
charge. 11 In addition, several federal courts have condemned blatantly de-
ceitful tactics as a reckless affront to the judiciary. 12 The fact that several
jurisdictions have held attorneys to strict standards of honesty shows that
truthfulness can be considered of primary importance to the proper function-
ing of the court system.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN ILLINOIS
The Illinois Supreme Court has ultimate authority over the Illinois system
of attorney discipline. 13 Supreme Court Rules empower the Illinois Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Commission to act as the supreme court's
agent in prosecuting disciplinary cases. 14 Procedurally, after the commis-
9. In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (attorney suspended from the practice of
law for one month for inviting his law partner to arbitrate a labor dispute without telling the
union that the arbitrator was his partner).
10. People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978). The defendant
in Tyler proved that the prosecutor substantially tailored his questioning before a grand jury to
extract false answers. The court held that where no legitimate investigatory function can be
shown, a perjury conviction against that witness is not justifiable. Id. at 259, 385 N.E.2d at
1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (where undercover agent
committed bribery and perjury to catch corrupt public officials, the court heavily criticized the
practice but reversed on other grounds); United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972)
(the court held that a fair trial was denied defendant because a government informer pretended
to be a co-defendant and the informer's attorney helped plan the litigation strategy of the other
defendants); United States v. Lusterino, 450 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1971) (the court held it reversi-
ble error for an informer to pose as an accomplice to the defendant and admit guilt in front of
the jury).
13. See In re Teitelbaum, 13 I11. 2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958)
(the court's inherent power to discipline attorneys is based on an 1899 case establishing an
inherent right to prescribe rules for the study of law and admission to practice. In re Day, 181
111. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899)). See In re Nesselson, 76 Ill. 2d 135, 390 N.E.2d 857 (1979), in
which the supreme court granted a petition for reinstatement, citing exclusive authority to regu-
late the practice of law. Id. at 138, 857 N.E.2d at 858. In addition, in In re Sherman, 60 11. 2d
590, 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975), the court, citing its ultimate authority for deciding discipline cases,
did not follow the review board's recommended action that the attorney be suspended but
instead only censured the attorney. The court reasoned that the fact the client suffered no loss
did not excuse the conduct, but that discipline should be mitigated because there was no other
evidence of misconduct in Sherman's 20 year legal career.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 751 (1977). On November 28, 1966, the Supreme Court of
Illinois adopted new rules governing trial and appellate procedures. The Supreme Court Rules
have now been incorporated into the Illinois Revised Statutes by the General Assembly and
include affirmation of the court's power to govern the registration and discipline of attorneys.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sion's informal investigation of suspected misconduct, the commission's ad-
ministrator sends the case to the inquiry board. 15 The inquiry board
evaluates the evidence and decides whether a formal complaint should be
filed with the hearing board. 16 All hearing board decisions against the at-
torney proceed next to the review board. 17 The attorney can avoid the
possibility of a public sanction by accepting a reprimand at the hearing board
level. "' The review board may dismiss the charges, reprimand the attor-
ney, or recommend that the Illinois Supreme Court censure, suspend, or
disbar the respondent. If the attorney wants to appeal the review board's
determination, an exception must be filed with the supreme court within 21
days -after service of the report. The court, at its discretion, may consider
the case. 19
The commission has considerable discretion in deciding the types of attor-
ney conduct to prosecute: it has authority to investigate and bring dis-
ciplinary charges against any attorney whose conduct tends to defeat the
administration of justice or bring the courts or the legal profession into
disrepute.20  The exact meaning of this standard of conduct is not always clear,
however, because of the supreme court's refusal to formally adopt the
Code 2 1 or to adhere strictly to stare decisis. 22 Instead, Illinois courts de-
Id. Consequently, the Illinois attorney discipline process is governed by the Supreme Court
Rules and by the commission's own administrative rules. Both sets of regulations are set forth in
a pamphlet published by the commission. See generally ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND Disci-
PLINARY COMMISSION, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS AND THE ATTORNEY REG-
ISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION (May 1, 1977). Before 1973, when the present
attorney disciplinary system became operative, local bar associations acted as commissioners of
the supreme court in disciplinary proceedings. See generally Murphy, A Short History of Dis-
ciplinary Procedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. BAR. J. 528 (1972).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 753(a) (1977). The inquiry board, comprised of not less
than 21 members, may act in panels of not less than three members, as designated by the
commission. The members, appointed by the commission, serve annual terms as commissioners
of the court. In addition to investigating matters referred to it by the administrator, the inquiry
board also has the power to initiate an investigation. Complaints voted by the inquiry board are
prepared by the administrator and filed with the hearing board.
16. Id. § 753(c). The hearing board, comprised of at least 21 members, may also act in
three-member panels appointed for one-year terms by the commission. The hearing board
makes findings of facts and conclusions of fact and law, together with a recommendation for
discipline, dismissal, or nondisciplinary suspension. Id.
17. Id. § 753(d)-(e). The nine-member review board is appointed by the Supreme Court.
Appointments are for three-year terms. A concurrence of five members is required before the
review board can reach a decision. Id.
18. Id. §§ 753, 769. This is an attorney's last chance to totally avoid publicity by privately
accepting a reprimand.
19. Id. § 753(e).
20. Id. § 752.
21. Although the court often applies the Code as a standard of conduct, see note 2 and
accompanying text supra, the court has never formally adopted the Code. Furthermore, be-
cause there is no strict stare decisis in Illinois attorney discipline cases, the fact that the Code
was applied in one case does not necessarilv mean it will always be applied. See note 23 infra.
22. See, e.g., In re Kien, 69 I11. 2d 355, 372 N.E.2d 376 (1977); In re Howard, 69 111. 2d
343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1977); In re Nesselson, 35 Ill. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966).
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cide each case on its own facts in an ad hoc fashion, 23 based on the assump-
tion that every attorney discipline case is unique. 24
THE FACTS OF IN RE FRIEDMAN
On May 12, 1976, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission brought disciplinary charges against Morton Friedman for his
conduct while chief of the criminal division of the Cook County State's At-
torney's Office. Friedman was charged with conduct tending to bring the
legal profession into disrepute and with violating four Disciplinary Rules of
the Code. 25 Specifically, Friedman was charged with knowingly using false
evidence, creating false evidence, secreting a witness, and acting in a man-
ner involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 26 The facts,
as stipulated by the parties, revealed that during two court proceedings,
Friedman knowingly allowed and encouraged police officers to perjure them-
selves.
The complaint against Friedman contained two counts. The facts that gave
rise to Count I began in 1973, when Charles Graber was arrested by Officer
Jerry Maculitis and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.
Maculitis met with Friedman after the officer believed he had been offered a
bribe by Lee Howard, Graber's attorney. Friedman directed the officer to
follow Howard's instructions even if they required him to commit perjury.
Following instructions, the officer falsely told the court that the
"breathalizer" operator, whose testimony was needed, was not present. In
fact, the witness was in the courtroom waiting to testify. After the charges
against Graber were dismissed, Howard paid Maculities the money he had
promised. The judge was then advised of what happened. 27 Later, Howard
was suspended from the practice of law for two years. 28
23. Since neither the Code nor the case law is controlling, Illinois attorneys are left with
only a vague common law of ethics to guide them. Swett, Illinois Attorney Discipline, 26 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 325, 333, 343-44 (1977). Virtually nothing else has been written about this com-
mon law of ethics, which seems to create a serious problem for the Illinois practitioner. There is
apparently only one other law review article on this topic, providing a collection of Illinois
disciplinary decisions prior to 1932. See Note, An Illinois Disbarment Proceeding, 26 ILL. L.
REV. 457 (1932).
24. See, e.g., In re Nesselson, 35 I11. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966). See note 13 supra.
25. 76 Ill. 2d at 393, 392 N.E.2d at 1333.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 393-94, 392 N.E.2d at 1333-34.
28. In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1977). Leaving the courtroom, Maculitis
asked Lee Howard how he had done and Howard answered, "Super." The officer then
motioned Howard into the washroom and motioned again toward his pocket. Howard placed
$50 in the officer's pocket and Maculitis handed him a grand jury subpoena.
Howard was acquitted in Cook County Circuit Court of criminal bribery charges. Attorney
disciplinary charges were then brought by the commission. The respondent argued that there
was no unethical conduct because his motive was good. The hearing board stated: "We consider
it an insult to our intelligence for you to suggest that you paid the money to the officer in order
to get him to tell the truth." The hearing board, however, recommended only reprimand.
When the Administrator did not agree, the hearing board dismissed the charges "with reluc-
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A similar situation gave rise to Count II. Juanita Guevera was arrested by
Officer Jose Martinez for the aggravated battery of Awilda Torres. After
meeting with Guevera's attorney, Paul Powell, Officer Martinez told Fried-
man that Powell would pay him to arrest Torres and use the threat of pros-
ecution to persuade her to drop the charges against Guevera. Friedman
told Martinez that he should give the appearance of cooperating with Powell.
Friedman also said that if Martinez was called as a witness at the pre-
liminary hearing, he should tell the court that Torres did not wish to ap-
pear. 29 Martinez then testified falsely under oath that he had spoken with
Torres and her mother, and found that they did not wish to prosecute.
Torres and her mother had, in fact, arrived at the hearing willing to testify, but
were escorted to the State's Attorney's Office and kept waiting, after being
told of the investigation of Powell. After the hearing, Powell made the $250
payment to Martinez. The court wvas informed of the ploy to gather evidence
against Powell and the charges against Guevera were reinstated. 30 Powell
was subsequently convicted of bribery 
After the charges of deceit were brought against Friedman by the Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, the case then proceeded to
the hearing board which found that the Code had not been violated. The
conduct was not unethical because of the lack of intent to permanently de-
ceive the court system. 32  The review board, however, rejected these con-
tance." Id. at 353, 372 N.E.2d at 375. The review board reversed the hearing board and
unanimously recommended disbarment. The board called this case "a most striking example of a
breakdown of basic concepts of legal integrity and a most serious challenge to the credibility of
the judicial process." Id. at 350, 372 N.E.2d at 374.
Howard argued before the supreme court that he had paid for truthful testimony, that he had
twice been found innocent of wrongdoing, and that he had been entrapped. The court flatly
rejected the proposition that there could ever be a proper motive for influencing testimony. In
addition, the court held that evidence insufficient to convict on criminal charges may be suffi-
cient to show a deviation from ethical standards of conduct. Finally, the supreme court held
that the entrapment defense might not be available in attorney discipline cases; however, even
if it were available, the necessary prolonged or persistent pressure was not shown in this case.
In re Howard, 69 I11. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1978).
29. 76 Ill. 2d at 395, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
30. Id. at 394-95, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
31. People v. Powell, 72 I11. 2d 50, 377 N.E.2d 803 (1978). After the hearing, Powell asked
Martinez to follow him to his car, which was parked outside. As they drove around the block,
Powell threw two $100 bills and a $50 bill on the floor in front of Officer Martinez's shoes. The
officer picked up the money, handed Powell a grand jury subpoena, then left the car. Powell
drove a short distance, left his car, and approached Martinez. Martinez then turned on a minia-
ture recorder.
This tape recording was apparently very important evidence against Powell. Excerpts in the
supreme court's opinion show that Powell pleaded with Officer Martinez not to turn the evi-
dence against him over to the State's Attorney. The supreme court reversed the appellate court
and affirmed the circuit court's conviction of Powell for bribery and solicitation of the obstruc-
tion of justice. Id.
32. 76 II1. 2d at 393, 401-02, 392 N.E.2d at 1333, 1337-38. This is the position adopted by
the concurring justices. Id.
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clusions and recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court censure Fried-
man. 33
THE COURT'S REASONING
In In re Friedman, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to discipline the
attorney despite the fact that he admitted allowing and encouraging false
testimony in court. 34 Although four of the six justices who heard the case
condemned the use of deceit, two of the four, Chief Justice Goldenhersh
and Justice Kluczynski, found other factors controlling. 35 These justices, in
delivering the court's decision, noted that no court had ever before decided
if it was ethical for a prosecutor to engage in conduct violative of the Code
for the purpose of developing evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecu-
tion. 36
The court then reviewed the two contentions made by respondent. First,
the respondent argued that the court-tolerated deceit in narcotics cases illus-
trates that the Code does not immunize the courtroom from deceptive inves-
tigative tactics. 37 The respondent also argued that his lofty motive negated
any technical violation of Code provisions and that any intent to subvert the
judicial process instead originated with the corrupt attorneys. 38 The attor-
33. 76 111. 2d at 393, 392 N.E.2d at 1333. The review board made this determination by a
five-to-three vote on Feb. 28, 1978. Id.
34. The facts of the case were not disputed, see note 4 supra.
35. 76 Il. 2d at 392-99, 392 N.E.2d at 1333-36. Chief Justice Goldenhersh delivered the
decision of the court, joined by Justice Kluczynski. These justices denounced the deceit yet
voted not to censure Friedman. The two concurring justices found Friedman's conduct ethical.
Id. at 399-405, 392 N.E.2d at 1336-39. The justices writing the two dissents found Friedman's
conduct deserving of censure. Id. at 406-13, 392 N.E.2d at 1339-43.
36. Id. at 395, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
37. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrels v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 442 (1932). Courts have often allowed the use of deceitful tactics in narcotics investi-
gations. The entrapment defense is defined very narrowly by the United States Supreme Court
and can be used successfully only when the government's deception actually implants the crimi-
nal design in the defendant's mind. Id.
Nevertheless, this kind of investigative tactic has been heavily criticized for allowing gov-
ernmental participation in crimes as a substitute for skillful investigation. Dix, Undercover
Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 203 (1975) Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Goldstein,
For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and
the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683 (1975); Lackland, United States v. Russell: The Defense of
Entrapment as Merely a Question of Intent, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 523 (1973).
Illinois, by statute and through case law, has expanded the entrapment defense beyond the
Supreme Court's Russell decision to offer more protection against extreme police practices. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7 (1977); People v. Dollen, 53 Ill. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972). See also
23 DEPAUL L. REV. 570 (1973). By statute, the legislature had made entrapment an affirmative
defense, giving the state the burden of proving the absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable
doubt since some evidence of entrapment is introduced. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 3, 7 (1977);
People v. Jensen, 37 I11. App. 3d 1010, 1015, 347 N.E.2d 371, 376 (1st Dist. 1976).
38. The good motive argument was found controlling by the original hearing board, See note
32 and accompanying text supra.
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ney disciplinary commission, on the other hand, contended that although
deceit is permissible in drug investigations, it may not be employed where
evidence is being gathered for subsequent prosecution of another matter.3 9
The commission also argued that motive should only be considered in de-
termining the appropriate sanction and not in deciding whether there has
been professional misconduct. 40
In finding that respondent's conduct violated accepted ethical guidelines,
the court noted that American Bar Association Standards require prosecutors
to know and follow standards of professional conduct defined in the codes
and cannons of the legal profession.41 The court also noted that ABA Stan-
dards expressly prohibit the use of false evidence, 42 as well as the Code
barring deceit in the courtroom. 43 Therefore, the justices delivering the
court's decision concluded that the ends do not justify the means. No viola-
tion of the integrity of the courtroom can be condoned, no matter what its
motivation. 44
After constructing this careful argument delineating that Friedman's
conduct was, in fact, unethical, Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice
Kluczynski then held that he should not be disciplined, listing four reasons
without further discussion. The court reasoned that Friedman acted "from a
sincere, if misguided, desire to bring corrupt attorneys to justice." 4 5  In
addition, other reasons listed included the absence of precedent or settled
opinion on this exact issue,4 6 the belief among some attorneys that such
deceit is an acceptable tactic, 4 7 and the evidence that Friedman had served
the public diligently and with integrity in the past.48
39. Governmental deceit in any investigation, even narcotics investigations, should be very
carefully limited. See note 37 supra. See generally notes 75-77 and accompanying text infra for
the proposition that no deceit is ever fully justifiable.
40. 76 Ill. 2d at 396, 392 N.E.2d at 1335.
41. Id. citing ABA STANDARDS, TFIE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.1(d) (1971).
42. Id. citing ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.6(a) (1971).
43. See notes 2, 3, and accompanying text supra.
44. 76 11. 2d at 397, 392 N.E.2d at 1335.
45. id. at 399, 392 N.E.2d at 1336.
46. Id. Even if there had been clear case precedent on this issue, it might not have been
ample guidance for Friedman because the Illinois Supreme Court does not strictly follow stare
decisis in attorney discipline cases. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. See also notes
87-89 and accompanying text infra.
On the other hand, the justices themselves pointed out that the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility has clear provisions prohibiting deceit in the courtroom. 76 II1. 2d at 396-98, 392 N.E.2d
at 1335-36. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
47. 76 II1. 2d at 398 99, 392 N.E.2d at 1336. The court cited In re Luster, 12 111. 2d 25, 145
N.E.2d 75 (1957), as authority for not censuring Friedman. In Luster, however, there was
reliance on an actual unpublished court decision and not reliance, as here, on an "apparently
considerable belief" demonstrated only by statements from well-known attorneys made after
respondent was charged with misconduct. Id. See note 50 infra.
48. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text infra.
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Justice Underwood's concurrence, 49 joined by Justice Ryan, found Fried-
man's conduct ethical because his actions were necessary under the cir-
cumstances and free from any intent to permanently deceive the courts.
These justices noted that a number of respected attorneys submitted state-
ments on Friedman's behalf, arguing that his conduct involved no profes-
sional impropriety. 50 The concurring justices found that there were no al-
ternative prosecutorial tactics available to Friedman and specifically rejected
alternatives such as charging the suspect defense attorneys with solicitation
of perjury or attempted bribery. 51 Characterizing these alternatives as
"naive," the concurring justices reasoned that prosecutions based upon one
police officer's testimony of an ambiguously phrased offer will rarely succeed
against a lawyer's vigorous denial. 52 In addition, the concurring justices
applied the criminal code's necessity defense, 53 asserting that some misrep-
resentation to the judge is required in order to secure the evidence of pay-
49. 76 I11. 2d at 399-405, 392 N.E.2d at 1336 (Underwood, J., concurring). The justices
noted that they concurred only in the decision and not in the rationale so that the complaint
against Friedman may be discharged in accordance with the quorum requirement of the Illinois
Constitution. The Illinois Constitution requires a four vote quorum for the supreme court to
decide a case. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1970). If the court had not been able to reach some
kind of a decision, Friedman would have been censured. The Illinois court follows United
States Supreme Court practices when there is no quorum, affirming the decision below without
giving it precedential value. Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 331 N.E.2d
65 (1975). See generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
50. The following eight attorneys submitted affidavits stating that Friedman's conduct was
ethical because he had a good motive: Professor Monroe Freedman of Hofstra Law School;
Cook County Circuit Judge Wayne W. Olson; Gino L. DiVito, Deputy State's Attorney, Crimi-
nal Prosecution Bureau; David Dorsen, former Assistant Chief Counsel of the Senate Watergate
Committee; James M. Schreier, Chief, Felony Trial Division, Cook County State's Attorney's
Office; James B. Haddad, Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Nicholas J. Motherway,
Phillip H. Corbov and Associates; and James R. Kavanaugh, Cook County State's Attorney's
Office. Respondent's Brief at la-32a.
These attorneys, with the exception of Freedman and Dorsen, also submitted personal
character references. In addition, fifteen other attorneys and eight non-lawyers submitted
character references. Id. These statements are relied upon by the concurring justices as exten-
sive authority for the proposition that deceit can be used as a proper investigative tactic. 76 II1.
2d at 399, 392 N.E.2d at 1336. The concurring justices also note that six of the 11 members of
the two panels below considered Friedman's conduct ethical. Id. (Underwood, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 404, 392 N.E.2d at 1338.
52. Id. For further discussion on alternatives available to Friedman, see notes 78-85 and
accompanying text infra.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (1977), provides for a necessity defense as follows:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if
the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and
reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury
greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.
For- further analysis of the Illinois statute, see Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal
Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 266, 283 (1975); see also
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STANFORD L.
REV. 213, 239 (1975).
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ment that is a "practical necessity" to obtain the conviction of a lawyer sus-
pected of corruption. 54 Conchding that deceit in the courtroom might
sometimes be a necessary investigative technique, the two concurring jus-
tices found that a requirement of "intent to permanently deceive" should be
read into the Code's provisions prohibiting deceit. 55
Justice Clark and Justice Moran each separately dissented, agreeing with
the majority's reasoning but rejecting its decision. The two dissenters also
strongly rejected the reasoning of the concurring justices. 56 Justice Clark
found that an attorney does not have the power to determine if there is a
good reason for deceiving a judge, even temporarily. 57 He insisted that
Friedman should have employed alternative tactics despite their limitations,
rather than sacrifice the integrity of the courtroom. 5 8  Justice Moran
54. 76 111. 2d at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339. The concurring justices cited In re Howard, 69
I11. 2d 343, 372 N. E.2d 371 (1978), to show the difficulty in obtaining convictions in bribery cases,
even where money has been paid. Howard was acquitted of criminal bribery charges despite
the fact that money had changed hands. Ironically, this is one of the cases where Friedman's
innovative methods were employed to gather evidence. See note 28 and accompanying text
supra. In re Howard makes painfully clear the fact that convictions are not always obtained
more easily just because deceitful tactics are used. Furthermore, the purpose of the judicial
system is not to achieve convictions but to achieve justice. See note 69 and accompanying text
infra.
55. 76 I11. 2d at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339. Monroe Freedman's affidavit is cited as authority
for the argument that the Code of Professional Responsibility should require an intent to per-
manently deceive. The concurring justices cited Freedman's quotation from his book: "Motive
is, of course, a primary consideration in making judgments regarding the ethical quality of
conduct." Id. at 400, 392 N.E.2d at 1446, quoting FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 83. An examina-
tion of the text cited, however, shows that in the same paragraph Freedman explained why
prosecutors must be held to the highest of ethical standards: "We are concerned here with the
attorney as public official, wielding enormous governmental powers, and responsible for assur-
ing not only that justice be done but that it appear to be done." FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at
83. This qualification on the importance of good motive suggests that Professor Freedman un-
derstands the harm a well-meaning prosecutor can do. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text
infra. See generally Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55
CEO. L.J. 1030 (1967).
As for the finding of the concurring justices that deceit by attorneys might sometimes be
allowable, they make no attempt to set forth when this temporary deceit would be an accepta-
ble tactic and when it would not. One advantage of a blanket rule prohibiting all deceit by
attorneys, or prohibiting all deceit by attorneys in court, would be that such a rule would not
require constant judicial interpretation of the question of when deceit would or would not be
tolerable. See notes 5-12 and accompanying text supra.
56. 76 I11. 2d at 406-13, 392 N.E.2d at 1339-43 (Clark, J., dissenting; Moran, J., dissenting).
57. 1d. at 411, 392 N.E.2d at 1342.
58. Id. The alternative Justice Clark found most practical was that Friedman could have
advised the trial judges or some other judicial officer of his plan before allowing the untruthful
testimony. Justice Clark also rejected the argument that Disciplinary Rule 7-110(B) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility precludes such a conference. DR 7-110(B) states:
(B) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another
to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before
whom the proceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
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characterized the concurring opinion's approach as "intolerably dangerous"
in that it suggested, under the guise of necessity, that the ends can justify
the means. ' He also asserted that truth is essential to the court system's
successful operation and that "one need not be trained in the law to know
that it is flatly unacceptable to prevaricate to or mislead the court or to be
instrumental in encouraging others to do so." 6°
CRITICISM AND ALTERNATIVES
The court did not discipline Friedman largely because a number of well-
known attorneys insisted that his good intentions justified his conduct. 61
There are, however, at least four reasons why good motive should not have
been considered a controlling factor. First, regardless of motive, the role of
the judge was usurped. In addition, individuals' rights might be threatened
in the future by prosecutors who will also claim good intentions. Third, mo-
tive is almost impossible to determine accurately. Finally, good motive can-
not be used to justify deceit when non-deceitful tactics are provided by stat-
ute.
An attorney who deceives a court, even for good reasons, has overstepped
long recognized bounds of authority 62 and has disrespectfully trampled on
the court's integrity. 63 The fact that truthfulness is vital to the function of
the judicial system is clearly demonstrated not only by the Disciplinary
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or
to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he
is not represented by a lawyer.
(4) As otherwise authorized by law.
Justice Clark argued that this rule is inapplicable because this kind of suitation does not involve
the merits of the case. Secondly, even if this rule is applicable it allows communication "as
otherwise authorized by law." Finally, Justice Clark asserted that even if there was a reason
why Friedman could not talk to the trial judge, he should have spoken with the Chief Judge of
the division or some other court officer instead of proceeding in sole reliance on his own belief
that his action was proper. 76 11. 2d at 411, 392 N.E.2d at 1342. See note 85 and accompanying
text infra for three reasons why this seemingly practical solution should be rejected.
59. 76 11. 2d at 412, 392 N.E.2d at 1342.
60. Id.
61. See notes 47, 50, and accompanying text supra.
62. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-09 (1974) (legitimate judicial need for infor-
mation outweighs the need for absolute executive privilege); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1972) (judicial approval of searches is required even in
domestic security cases; broad police investigative powers must be tempered with objective
judicial screening to protect the privacy rights of individuals); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
176 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is").
63. Friedman's conduct can be compared roughly to a trespass action. The fact that no harm
was immediately apparent does not mean that a valid interest was not infringed upon. See
Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 370 (1835) (tort trespass action allowed on principle that damage
is inferred by law whenever there is unauthorized entry onto the land of another).
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Rules against deceit, 64 but also by state statutes against perjury 65 and by the
oath that witnesses must take before testifying. 66 Moreover, allowing a mo-
tive defense might result in additional encroachments on the autonomy of
the judiciary by other zealous prosecutors. 67 For this reason, any attorney
who deceives a judge for his own purposes, no matter how laudatory, should
be seen as showing a dangerous and arrogant disrespect for the judiciary.
This disregard warrants discipline in itself, regardless of the fact that no
harm to the parties may be immediately apparent.
Beyond invasion of the judicial role, a second reason for disregarding mo-
tive as a controlling factor in Friedman is that the public must be protected
from well-meaning government officials who use their power unwisely with-
out actually breaking the letter of the law. 68 Even if it can be assumed
momentarily that Friedman was expertly able to manipulate the judicial sys-
tem without apparent harm, the next prosecutor determined to win a convic-
tion 6 9 might not be able to use deceit so masterfully. The integrity of the
courtroom, however, is too important to the proper functioning of the adver-
sary system to entrust it to one of the adversary parties for safekeeping. 70
A third obvious problem with motive is that it is difficult to ascertain
accurately. In fact, the various opinions in In re Friedman interpret Fried-
64. See note 3 supra.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-2 to -3 (1977).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 101, § 3 (1977).
67. For a discussion of prosecutorial zeal, see Seymour, Why Prosecutors Act Like Pros-
ecutors, Vol. 11, No. 6, The Record of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 302, 312-13
(1956); Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 S.W.U. L. REV. 98, 109-12 (1975). See
generally NATIONAL COLLEGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, THE PROSECUTOR IN AMERICA:
ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR (1977).
68. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
Experience should teach us to Ibe most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing.
For an example of the harm an unscrupulous public official can do legally while claiming good
motives, see generally R. FRIED, MEN AGAINST MCCARTHY (1976). See also FREEDMAN, supra
note 5, at 83; Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO.
L.J. 1030 (1967); 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 404 (1974). But see Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor
in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973).
69. See Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 S.W.U. L. REV. 98, 110-12 (1975).
Imitation of superiors and peer group pressure are two factors that help to lead many pros-
ecutors into a dangerous "conviction psychology," where defendants are presumed guilty because
an innocent person would not be introduced into the criminal justice process. Consequently,
some long-time prosecutors see the judicial system as a means for obtaining convictions, not
justice. Id.
70. Encouraging deceit by a witness is not a proper prosecutorial tactic. Although the mo-
tive of the prosecutor has seldom been an issue at trial, the New York Court of Appeals has
held that overtly bad prosecutorial motive can be a defense in a criminal action. People v.
Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 259, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (1978). See note 10
and accompanying text supra.
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man's intentions differently. Justice Clark characterized Friedman's motive
as arrogant and self-righteous. 71 The concurring opinion portrayed him as a
tough, upstanding prosecutor. 72 The decision of the court, however, re-
ferred to him as "sincere, if misguided." 73  Rather than allowing an attorney
discipline decision to rest on an adjudication of the sincerity or arrogance of
the attorney, it is more logical, and perhaps more just, to focus on the con-
duct as is done in other types of attorney discipline cases.74
A fourth reason for rejecting a good motive defense is that any justification
of deceit undercuts the public's already-shaken confidence in American in-
stitutions. 75 Over the past several decades, lying as a socially acceptable
alternative in problem solving has become increasingly prevalent.76  This
71. 76 II1. 2d at 407-08, 392 N.E.2d at 1340 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark stated
"[T]hat no prior case has addressed the precise form of deception practiced here is hardly
exculpatory: If anything, the absence of such authority indicates that prosecutors ordinarily do
not consider it within their power to determine whether to deceive judges." Id.
72. Id. at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339 (Underwood, J., concurring). The concurring justices
characterize Friedman's motivation and conduct in this way: "In short, it is undisputed that
respondent was a conscientious prosecutor dedicated to improving the administration of criminal
justice .... At no time did respondent intend to permanently deceive anyone, and the neces-
sary, temporary deception practiced upon the court was corrected immediately after it had
served its purpose." Id.
73. Id. at 399, 392 N.E.2d at 1336.
74. In three recent bribery cases, the supreme court rejected arguments that the
respondent-attorneys were only paying witnesses money to obtain the truth. In re Porcelli, No.
51772 (I11. Nov. 21, 1979) (attorney found not guilty of criminal bribery charges suspended from
the practice of law for one year); In re Kien, 69 III. 2d at 361-62, 273 N.E.2d at 379 (18 month
suspension ordered); In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d at 350, 372 N.E.2d at 374 (two year suspension
ordered). See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
Claims of honest motive or good intentions are also irrelevent in attorney discipline cases
involving conflict of interest charges. See In re LaPinska, 72 Ill. 2d 461, 469-70, 381 N.E.2d
700, 703 (1978) ("[A]n attorney who represents the public must be particularly wary of potential
conflicts because he is measured not only by the honesty of his intentions and motives, but by
the suspicion with which his acts may be viewed by the public."); In re Michal, 415 Ill. 150,
112 N.E.2d 603 (1953); People v. Gerold, 265 I11. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914); Scheffki v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. RR Co., 1 111. App. 3d 557, 274 N.E.2d 631 (1st Dist. 1971).
75. In 1975 and 1976, Cambridge Survey Research found that 69 percent of the respondents
to a poll agreed that "over the last ten years, this country's leaders have consistently lied to the
people. S. BOK, LYING, MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE xviii (1978) [hereinafter
cited as S. BOK]. In addition, a Harris poll found that between 1966 and 1976, confidence in
medicine dropped from 73 percent to 42 percent, confidence in major companies from 55 per-
cent to 16 percent, and confidence in advertising agencies dropped from 21 percent to 7 per-
cent. Id. See the text accompanying note 77 infra for information on public confidence in law
firms.
76. S. BOK, supra note 73, at xvi-xxii Bok, who teaches ethics in medicine at Harvard and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, asserts as the thesis of her book that lying is never fully
justifiable and that well-meaning lies disguise and fuel other wrongs. Id. at 242-49. Analyzing
scores of different kinds of lies, all supposedly justified by good motives, Bok concludes that all
lies have a detrimental impact on public confidence. Id. See note 75 supra. In addition to lying
for clients, id. at 146-164, Bok also rejects justification for placebos, and white lies in letters of
recommendation. Id. at 57-72. Possibly because of her medical ethics background, she is also
quick to argue against deceptive social science research and lies to the sick and dying. Id. at
182-202, 220-22.
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avalanche of untruthfulness has been cited as a reason for modern skepticism
about institutions that were once highly respected. For example, in 1976,
only 12 percent of the American public expressed confidence in law firms. In
1973, 24 percent expressed such confidence. 77
The deceit in this case is especially unwarranted in that non-deceitful al-
ternatives were available to Friedman. Although concurring Justices Under-
wood and Ryan found that no realistic alternatives were available, 78 alterna-
tive tactics suggested by the other justices included prosecution for
attempted bribery, 79 prosecution for solicitation, 8" an attorney disciplinary
action, 8 1 or an effort to obtain advance judicial approval of the plan from the
trial judge or the chief judge.8 2  The concurring justices, however, consid-
ered advising the trial judge improper.8 3 While seeking some type of judi-
cial approval would allow the decision to be made by an objective third
party, 84 it is still objectionable. A contrived trial would not only waste the
court's time, but also create an appearance of impropriety. 85 Nevertheless,
77. S. BOK, supra note 75, at xviii. One possible reason for this decline in confidence in law
firms might be that the 1973 poll was taken before the public realized that the Watergate Affair
and the events surrounding President Nixon's resignation showed a far-reaching pattern of cor-
ruption devised and carried out by many top government attorneys.
78. 76 Ill. 2d at 404-05, 392 N.E.2d at 1338 (Underwood, J., concurring). See notes 51-54
and accompanying text supra.
79. Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Kluczynski suggest prosecution for attempted
bribery pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-4, 33-1 (1977). 76 I11. 2d at 398, 392 N.E.2d
at 1336.
justice Clark pointed out that attorneys can be convicted of conspiring to bribe without
money actually changing hands. United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971). 76 111. 2d at 408, 392 N.E.2d at 1340 (Clark, J., dissenting).
80. Chief Justice Coldenhersh and Justice Kluczynski noted that Friedman could have
charged the attorneys with solicitation of perjury pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-1,
32-2 (1977). 76 I11. 2d at 398, 392 N.E.2d at 1336.
81. Justice Clark's dissent also cites cases where attorneys disciplinary actions were success-
fully maintained after attorneys avoided criminal prosecution. 76 Ill. 2d at 408, 392 N.E.2d at
1340 (Clark, J., dissenting), citing In re Goldstein, 411 II1. 360, 104 N.E.2d 227 (1952), accord,
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 325 A.2d 718 (1974).
82. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
83. Justice Underwood stated in his concurrence that deceiving the judge is preferable to
involving the judge in the deceit by giving the bench advance notice of the scheme. 76 111. 2d
at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339 (Underwood, J., concurring).
84. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1972); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (a decision resulting in an invasion of individual privacy
should be made by a "neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.")
85. In addition to wasting the court's time and creating an appearance of impropriety, there
is a strong argument to be made that the integrity of the entire system suffers whenever lies are
heard in court. See Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977
UTAH L. REV. 653.
Moreover, there is a philosphical argument that society suffers when lies are told; therefore,
no lie is really justifiable. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra. Contra, FREEDMAN,
supra note 5, at 27-41.
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the state could have prevented the bribing of witnesses and avoided the use
of deceit as an investigative method by employing any of the three alterna-
tives provided by statute: attorney discipline, prosecution on attempt
charges, or prosecution for solicitation.
IMPACT
Ironically, the prospective rule that In re Friedman formulates is con-
tradictory to the court's decision. Although the court decided not to sanction
Friedman, the decision will deter deceit because four justices did voice
disapproval of the tactic. 86 Nevertheless, censure would have been the
most effective way to ensure that prosecutors will not employ deceitful tac-
tics in Illinois courtrooms.
From a broader perspective, In re Friedman is an important case because of
the court's acceptance of the good motive defense, illustrating two ways that
subjectivity is built into the Illinois attorney discipline system. First, there is
no clear standard of conduct for attorneys. The most precedential weight any
supreme court discipline decision can ever have is as persuasive authority
because there is no strict stare decisis in Illinois attorney discipline cases.
8 7
As a result, the Illinois practitioner is left with only a vague, non-binding
common law of ethics for guidance. 88 One justice recently criticized this
vague standard stating that "our continued adherence to a case-by-case 'total-
ity of the circumstances' approach will leave our standards opaque and our
sanctions unpredictable. Such unpredictability will require every case to be
brought before us for review." 8 9
In the absence of comprehensive, controlling case law, the Code's fre-
quent application as a standard makes it an important guide for the Illinois
attorney. Since the Code's prohibitions against false testimony are clear and
intent to permanently deceive is not required by its language, 90 the court
should have followed the Code's ample guidance. 91
Second, subjectivity in the Illinois attorney discipline system is also en-
couraged by the overly broad use of mitigating evidence. Although mitigat-
ing evidence of good character or community involvement is regularly
86. Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Kluczynski both rejected Friedman's investigative
tactics, despite the fact that they voted not to censure the respondent. 76 Ill. 2d at 398-99, 392
N.E.2d at 1336. The dissenters, Justice Clark and Justice Moran, each found the prosecutorial
deceit repugnant and voted for censure. Id. at 406-13, 392 N.E.2d at 1339-43 (Clark, J., and
Moran, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., In re Kien, 69 I11. 2d 355, 372 N.E.2d 376 (1977); In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d
343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1977); In re Nesselson, 35 Ill. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966).
88. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
89. In re Kien, 69 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 372 N.E.2d at 381 (Clark, J., dissenting).
90. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR7-102(A)(4), DR7-102(A)(6), DR7-
109(B), and DRI-102(A)(4).
91. See note 47 supra for an explanation of why In re Luster is not appropriate persuasive
authority for not disciplining Friedman.
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examined in determining the punishment in attorney discipline cases, 92 this
kind of evidence is irrelevant because the public should be able to expect
good conduct as well as community involvement from every attorney. 93 In
In re Friedman, the affidavits and character references from judges, pros-
ecutors, the Governor of Illinois, a law school dean, and others highly
praised Friedman. Some references even expressed approval of the tactics
Friedman employed. 94 Since the supreme court's willingness to accept the
defense of good motive results largely from the fact that a number of well-
known attorneys supported Friedman, 95 In re Friedman lends credibility to
the position that broad mitigating evidence is sometimes misapplied. In the
future, such evidence should be carefully applied so as only to mitigate
punishment and should not be applied as a defense to substantive charges. 96
CONCLUSION
The disciplinary charges against the respondent in In re Friedman should
not have been discharged. Good motive is not an acceptable justification for
deceiving the judiciary and using the court system as an investigative tool.
Allowing a good motive defense is harmful not only because it invites inva-
sion of the judicial function and possible abuses of the rights of private citi-
zens, but also because motive is impossible to ascertain accurately. Further-
more, if deceit may ever be justified, it is an inappropriate practice under
statutes providing several means for limiting corruption through more tradi-
tional law enforcement methods. Employment of a good motive justification
to avoid censuring a prominent attorney suggests an embarrassing degree of
subjectivity in an attorney discipline system, allowing broad judicial discre-
tion in the application of already vague standards.
Robert C. Cook
92. Although evidence of good character or reputation is no defense to specific misconduct
charges, it is an element often considered in mitigation of discipline. See, e.g., In re Kien, 69
Ill. 2d 355, 372 N.E.2d 376 (1977) (18 month suspension ordered in bribery case); In re How-
ard, 69 Ill. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1977) (two year suspension ordered in bribery case); and li
re Costigan, 63 II1. 2d 230, 347 N.E.2d 129 (1976) (two 'ear suspension for forging clients'
names to secure a loan for paying personal debts).
93. In re Kien, 69 111. 2d1 at 365-66, 372 N.E.2d at 381 (Clark, J., dissenting). For a more
harsh opinion on why broad use of mitigating evidence is undesirable, see also S. TISHER, L.
BERNABEI AND NI. GREEN, BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE 97 (1977). ("When sanctions are
imposed disciplinary boards often search out mitigating circumstances to cushion the blow").
94. 76 Ill. 2d at 398-401, 392 N.E.2d at 1336-37.
95. Id.
96. Swett, Illinois Attorney Discipline, 26 DEPAuL L. REV. 325, 344 (1977). "Failure to
keep the issues clearly defined makes it treacherously easy for the disciplinary body to make its
decision on its opinion of the responding attorney's character rather than on the merits of the
case." Id. at 355.
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